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received no mention in the principal New York financial pages.4 Judging
their interest in the case on the basis of what they had printed previously, it
may be that the papers would have printed a notice of the removal if the com-
mission release had concisely summarized the background of the case insofar
as it pertained to the lifting of the stop order. Such a situation merely supports
the suggestion that the commission consider carefully the "weighting" of their
releases, and the effect they have on newspaper publicity.
EFFECT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY ACT ON STATE
POWER OVER CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
Since Congress has provided for corporate reorganization under the bank-
ruptcy power,' a question is raised as to the effect of this action upon state power
over corporate reorganization. The question may become especially important
if reorganizers seek state court reorganizations in order to avoid the reform
provisions of Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act.2 This path is open
to reorganizers not only through the equity receivership but through recent
amendments to state corporation acts.3 The grant of power under these statutes
148 Note 95 supra, and accompanying text.
'Chapter X of the National Bankruptcy Act as amended in 52 Stat. 883 et seq. (1938),
ii U.S.C.A. § 5oI et seq. (i939). The constitutionality of similar legislation has been upheld,
Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U.S. 648 (i935)
(sustaining § 77, which provided for railroad reorganizations); Campbell v. Alleghany Co.,
75 F. (2d) 947 (C.C.A. 4th 1935) (sustaining § 77B, the predecessor of Chapter X); In re
Central Funding Co., 75 F. (2d) 256 (C.C.A. 2d i935) (sustaining § 77B); cf. In re Tennessee
Pub. Co., 81 F. (2d) 463 (C.C.A. 6th 1936) (sustaining § 77B).
- See discussion of reform provisions in Rostow and Cutler, Competing Systems of Corpo-
rate Reorganization: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 Yale L. J. 1334 (i939);
Levi, Corporate Reorganization and a Ministry of justice, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 3 (1938)-
3 These provisions were taken from the arrangements section of the English Companies Act.
See Rosenberg, Reorganization-Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow, 25 Va. L. Rev. 129, 140
(1938); Fraser, Reorganization of Companies in Canada, 27 Col. L. Rev. 932 (1927). These
provisions make a plan of reorganization binding on dissenting creditors and stockholders
when consented to by a majority in number representing three-quarters in amount of the credi-
tors, or of each class thereof, and by the holders of (usually) three-quarters of the voting stock,
or of each class thereof, and when approved by a court of competent jurisdiction. Some stat-
utes stipulate that these provisions may be contained in the articles of incorporation, Colo.
Stat. Ann. (lVlichie, 1935) c. 41, § 6; Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 2037; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann.
(Corrick, Supp. 1939) § 17-2803; La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart, 1939) § ix43; Mich. Comp. Laws
(Mason, Supp. 1935) § 10135-4; W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1937) § 3018. If they
are not contained in the original articles but are added by amendment, clearly they bind only
subsequent creditors, although under the reserved power to amend corporate charters, they
may bind all stockholders unless the statute limits their operation to stockholders contracting
subsequent to the amendment. See Del. Rev. Code (ig35) § 2035; Mich. Comp. Laws (Mason,
Supp. 1935) § 10135-4; W.Va. Code Ann. (Michie & Sublett, 1937) § 30x5. The Minnesota
statute makes all corporations subject to these provisions unless the articles of incorporation
specify otherwise, Minn. Stat. (Mason, Supp. i94o) § 7492-54. Other statutes do not leave
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to a stated proportion of security holders to bind dissenters, and the absence of
reform provisions, may make the state proceedings especially attractive. The
purpose of this note is to examine the nature of state and federal power in
bankruptcy and to determine whether state power over reorganization is
suspended.
It has long been settled that the power of Congress to establish uniform laws
on the subject of bankruptcies does not prohibit state bankruptcy legislation
until the federal power is exercised.4 The federal power, when exercised by the
passage of a national bankruptcy system, operates on the state power in two
ways. First, it deprives the states of jurisdiction by suspending all state laws
which are regarded as bankruptcy laws.s Second, state laws on the subject of
debtor-creditor relations which are not regarded as bankruptcy laws are not
suspended, and proceedings in the state courts under such laws, statutory or
common law, for the distribution of a debtor's assets are valid unless super-
seded by an action in the federal bankruptcy court. 6 Thus in a traditional
bankruptcy action, the jurisdiction of the federal court must be asserted within
four months after a state court has taken jurisdiction of the debtor's assets
under a creditor's bill in order to supersede the state court action; if this re-
quirement is met, the federal court assumes control over the debtor's assets
and distributes them in accordance with the federal law.7 But where the state
law is suspended rather than superseded, state courts are without jurisdiction
over the debtor's assets.' As a result of suspension, federal jurisdiction in
bankruptcy may be invoked more than four months after a state insolvency
the applicability of the provisions to be determined by the articles of incorporation, but in-
clude the provisions in the dissolution and liquidation sections, making reorganization an al-
ternative to winding-up, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) C. 32, § 157.90; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1938)
tit. i5, § 2852-1109; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, Supp. 1939) § 3803-58. It has been
said that these provisions were drafted because of doubt that the court had power to bind
non-assenting creditors or shareholders to a reorganization plan without statutory sanction.
See Commissioners' Note to § 59 of the Uniform Business Corporation Act, 9 U.L.A. io2-3
(1932), which criticizes the contract theory underlying those statutes which allow the corpora-
tion to decide, in the articles of incorporation, whether to be governed by these reorganization
provisions.
4 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 122, i96 (1819).
s Int'l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929). The Court spoke of the Arkansas statute
as "superseded" by the Bankruptcy Act; the preferable term, according to the usage in this
note, is "suspended."
6 Boese v. King, io8 U.S. 379 (1883); Pobreslo v. Boyd Co., 287 U.S. 518 (i933).
7Glenn, Liquidation §§ 228, 579 (1935). But the four-month limitation may not apply to a
state court action instituted by a stockholder, unless creditors have filed claims with the state
receiver in the stockholder's action more than four months before bankruptcy. See 4 Univ.
Chi. L. Rev. 134, 135 (1936). The four-month limit does not apply to supersession by a federal
court in reorganization. See note 39 and related text infra.
9In re Weedman Stave Co., igg Fed. 948 (D.C. Ark. 1912); In re Curtis, 9i Fed. 737
(D.C. III. z899).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
proceeding is begun.9 Furthermore, a dissenting creditor need not invoke the
federal bankruptcy jurisdiction, but may attack the state court proceedings
collaterally by attaching the property in the control of the state court,"° and
thereby gain a preference which will be valid unless a petition in bankruptcy
is filed within four months. Even if the state court proceedings are carried to a
conclusion through failure to attack them, the discharge of the debtor does not
bar an action to collect the debt.:" But if the insolvent estate is distributed
among creditors by order of the state court, the distribution possibly will be
sustained on the basis of the dissenter's laches, and distributees will thus be
protected against attachment.X2
Inasmuch as a state act is suspended only if it is bankruptcy legislation, it has
become necessary for courts to consider the nature of bankruptcy. Several tests
have been suggested. According to the involuntary test, a law allowing a credi-
tor to compel the application of the debtor's property to the payment of his
debts despite the debtor's opposition, is a bankruptcy law.'3 The coercion test
emphasizes equal distribution of the debtor's property, the significant coercion
being that exerted on the creditors to prevent a race of diligence and the grant-
ing of preferences by the debtor.14 Under this test the law compelling equal
distribution may be voluntary or involuntary as to the debtor. The two tests
represent the property distribution or creditor relief aspect of bankruptcy. A
third test, representing the debtor relief aspect, stresses the fact that the law
provides for the debtor's discharge from the balance of his debts after his non-
exempt property has been distributed among his creditors.5
The courts have generally accepted the discharge test. The application of
this test results in the suspension of only some of the devices for the distribution
of a debtor's property under state law. A device at common law is the assign-
ment for the benefit of creditors. An assignment, made through the voluntary
action of the assignor-debtor regardless of the consent or opposition of creditors,
prevents a creditor's race for the attachment of the property because title is
9 In re Weedman Stave Co., igg Fed. 948 (D.C. Ark. 1912).
10 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
- First Nat'l Bank of Guilford v. Ware, 95 Me. 388, 5o At. 24 (igo).
12 Cf. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 5o8--o (1913); Boese v. King, io8
U.S. 379, 386 (1883); Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U.S. 496, 5oi (1875), in which the Court, discussing
preferences voidable by the institution of bankruptcy jurisdiction within the statutory period,
said that preferences not thus avoided are "presumed" to be "acquiesced in by the creditors."
13 [1938] Wis. L. Rev. 302.
X4 Radin, What Is a Bankruptcy Act?, 2o A.BA.J. 792 (1934), advocating the coercion test,
criticizes the involuntary test on the ground that a levy of execution on a debtor's property
by a single creditor is likewise involuntary.
ns The discharge test has been criticized on the ground that since discharge was not included
in the original English bankruptcy legislation, it is not essential to a bankruptcy system, Glenn,
Liquidation 21o (1935). It is suggested that a test of bankruptcy is whether or not the dis-
tribution of the debtor's assets can be made by act of the parties or whether court action is
necessary, ibid., at 211; cf. In re Sievers, 91 Fed. 366, 368 (D.C. Mo. 1899).
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placed in an assignee, and does not result in the discharge of unpaid obliga-
tions.x6 The power to make assignments is not suspended by the passage of a
federal bankruptcy law.'7 Some jurisdictions also recognize the power of an
assignor to include in the deed of assignment a release provision which
binds debtors who share in the distribution under the assignment; credi-
tors who refuse to accept a dividend in the distribution retain their claims
against the debtor. Other courts refuse to recognize this power of an assignor
on the ground that it allows the assignor to coerce creditors into granting re-
leases by putting all his present property beyond their reach unless they consent
to his discharge, or on the ground that such an assignment is a fraudulent con-
veyance unless it further provides that any surplus remaining after distribution
among creditors consenting to the release shall be distributed among non-
assenting creditors.' 8 Where the power of an assignor to exact releases is
recognized, it is probably not suspended when the federal government occupies
the bankruptcy field. Such releases are said to take effect by contract of the
parties, while it is discharge by force of statute which characterizes bankruptcy
under the discharge test. 9
State statutes which codify the common law assignment and add administra-
tive safeguards, such as the bonding of the assignee and court supervision of his
accounts, are not suspended by the passage of federal bankruptcy legislation.20
But if a statute adds a discharge provision, the statute may be wholly sus-
pended, or the discharge provision may be excised.21
16 See in general Glenn, Liquidation c. x (1935); Mulder and Solomon, Effect of the
Chandler Act upon General Assignments and Compositions, 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 763, 765-6,
768-72 (1939).
17 Mayer v. Hellman, 9I U.S. 496 (1875) (note that the Court apparently regarded equally
as important as the lack of a discharge provision the fact that an assignment is not adverse to
creditors, and that the statute did not compel assignments); Stellwagon v. Clum, 245 U.S. 6o5,
617 (1918) (here the lack of a discharge provision was stressed); Maltbie v. Hotchkiss, 38 Conn.
8o (1871).
is Upholding the release provision: Patty-Joiner & Eubank Co. v. Cummins, 93 Tex. 598,
57 S.W. 566 (igoo); Haijek & Simecek v. Luck, 96 Tex. 517, 74 S.W. 305 (z9o3). Holding the
release provision invalid: Nelson v. Harper, 122 Ark. 39, i82 S.W. 5ig (i916). See Glenn,
Liquidation § iig (1935).
'9 Haijek & Simecek v. Luck, 96 Tex. 517, 74 S.W. 305 (r9o3); cf. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus,
278 U.S. 261, 268 (1929); Johnson v. Star, 287 U.S. 527 (933); In re McElwain, 296 Fed. 112
(C.C.A. 3 d 1924) (the discharge feature of the Pennsylvania statute, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
1930) tit. 39, § zoo, was later said to be suspended, under the authority of the Pinkus and Star
cases, in Fidelity Trust Co. v. Union Nat'l Bank of Pittsburgh, 313 Pa. 467, 485-6, 169 Adt.
209, 216-17 (0933)).
2o Mayer v. Hellman, 91 U.S. 496 (1875); Finch v. Watson Investment Co., 184 Ark. 312,
42 S.W. (2d) 214 (i93i); Beck v. Parker, 65 Pa. 262 (1870).
2 "Statute suspended: Int'l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929) (the court refused to
consider the statute merely an assignment statute because it provided for the transfer of the
property under "conditions intended to secure the debtor's discharge"); Tacoma Grocery Co.
v. Doersch, 168 Wash. 6o6, 12 P. (2d) 929 (19"32) (note synonymous use of "suspend" and
"supersede"; also note that although not mentioned by the court, the statute in question con-
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Several state and lower federal courts have gone further and invalidated
state statutes not containing discharge provisions. These courts have empha-
sized the so-called coercion test, suspending state statutes which compel equal
distribution of the debtor's assets.22 As additional reasons for suspending the
Illinois assignment statute, it was said in In re Curtis3 that Congress, by mak-
ing the assignment for the benefit of creditors an act of bankruptcy, intended
that the debtor's estate be administered in the manner prescribed by the Na-
tional Bankruptcy Act; and in Harbaugh v. Costello24 that the constitutional re-
tained a discharge provision, Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § xoo); Hasbrouck v.
La Febre, 23 Wyo. 367, 152 Pac. z68 (i9z5); Pelton v. Sheridan, 74 Ore. 176, I44 Pac. 410
(i914); Ketcham v. McNamara, 72 Conn. 709, 46 Ad. 146 (igoo). Discharge provision ex-
cised: Pobreslo v. Boyd Co., 287 U.S. 5z8 (1933); Johnson v. Star, 287 U.S. 527 (1933);
Boese v. King, io8 U.S. 379 (1883).
If a state statute is wholly suspended, it is said to be a state insolvency law; if only the dis-
charge provision is suspended, it is said that the statute is merelya codification of the common
law assignment with a discharge provision. Occasionally, however, a state "insolvent" law is
not suspended because it is really only an assignment statute. See, e.g., Maltbie v. Hotchkiss,
38 Conn. 8o (1871). It has been suggested that whether a statute will be regarded as an in-
solvency or assignment statute depends on whether "the direct aid of the courts" is necessary,
as in the Pinkus case, or whether, despite statutory regulation, distribution of the debtor's
assets is made under "a trust created by the debtor's own conveyance," as in the Pobreslo case,
Glenn, Liquidation 2 11-12 (1935).
In addition to a release under a common law assignment, Haijek & Simecek v. Luck, 96
Tex. 517, 74 S.W. 305 (I9O3), a release can also be effected on ordinary contract principles,
Brown Shoe Co. v. Beall, 107 S.W. (2d) 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
= In re Salmon & Salmon, z43 Fed. 395 (D.C. Mo. x9o6); In re Smith, 92 Fed. 135 (D.C.
Ind. 1899) (the court erroneously assumed that if the state statute was not suspended, the
state court, getting jurisdiction before the federal bankruptcy jurisdiction was invoked, could
not be ousted by the federal court within the four-month period; it overlooked the fact that
even if the state statute is in force, the jurisdiction of the federal court is not concurrent with
that of the state court, but paramount to it); In re Reynolds, Fed. Cas. No. 11723 (C.C. R.I.
z874). The authority of the first two cases may be doubted because the decision in each could
have rested on the point of supersession instead of suspension.
2391 Fed. 737, 741 (D.C. Ill. xg9) (if the Illinois court had not held the Illinois assign-
ment statute an insolvency law, the decision in this case could have rested on the supersession
point).
'4 184 Ill. 110, 118, 56 N.E. 363, 365 (I9OO) (note synonymous use of "suspend" and "su-
persede"). The Illinois statute had previously been declared an insolvency law, not merely a
statute regulating assignments, because it turned partial assignments (assignments for the
benefit of some creditors) into assignments for the benefit of all creditors, Hanchett v. Water-
bury, 15 11. 220, 32 N.E. 194 (1885) (concerned with the exclusive jurisdiction of the county
court under the assignment statute). See Glenn, Liquidation § II (193s). For the suggested
effect of the decision in Harbaugh v. Costello on the liquidation, dissolution, and reorganiza-
tion provisions of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, see Miller, The Illinois Business Cor-
poration Act and Bankruptcy Legislation, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 695 (1935). Although statutory as-
signments are suspended in Illinois, the common law assignment remains, Pogue v. Rowe, 236
Ill. 157, 86 N.E. 207 (i9o8). But if the uniformity argument made in the Harbaugh case to
sustain suspension of statutory assignments is valid, common law assignments should also be
suspended.
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quirement of uniform bankruptcy legislation would be disregarded if distribu-
tion of the debtor's assets were made under state law.
However valid the discharge test may be in the case of insolvent individuals,
it is not significant in the case of insolvent corporations which are dissolved.
The conflict with federal bankruptcy jurisdiction usually arises in these cases
under state statutes providing for corporate dissolution. An insolvent corpora-
tion which is dissolved is in certain respects like an insolvent decedent; 25 because
the legal entity ceases to exist, there is no need for a discharge.26 Furthermore,
since only the state which created the corporation can dissolve it, and since on
dissolution some provision must be made for distributing the corporation's
assets, the enactment of federal bankruptcy legislation does not suspend state
power over corporate dissolutions. 2 7
If, however, a corporation may be put into bankruptcy, it cannot evade the
operation of the bankruptcy law by resort to liquidation through dissolution
proceedings in the state court. In other words, although state power to dissolve
corporations is not suspended21 it is liable to be superseded by a seasonably
filed petition in bankruptcy.29 Even if the insolvent corporation has already
been dissolved under state law, so long as undistributed assets remain, the
federal court may assert bankruptcy jurisdiction in a suit subsequently in-
2S State jurisdiction over the estates of insolvent decedents is not suspended by federal bank-
ruptcy legislation, Gilbert's Collier, Bankruptcy 3 (4th ed. 1937).
2See Exploration Mercantile Co. v. Pacific Hardware & Steel Co., 177 Fed. 825 (C.C.A.
9th igxo); In re Hall, isi Fed. 992 (D.C. Conn. z9o3); In re Merchants' Ins. Co., Fed. Cas.
No. 944r (D.C. Ill. 187). In In re Weedman Stave Co., igg Fed. 948 (D.C. Ark. x912), a
statute providing for the liquidation of an insolvent corporation was held to be an insolvency
law, the reason given being that discharge is not a necessary element of such a law. The pro-
vision that creditors' claims must be presented within a limited period or be barred was evi-
dently not regarded as a discharge provision. But in Moody v. Port Clyde Development Co.,
102 Me. 365, 66 Atl. 967 (i9o7), such a provision was so regarded, and hence the statute was
held suspended. Upon the repeal of that provision, the statute was held valid in Carter, Carter
& Meigs Co. v. Stewart Drug Co., 115 Me. 289, 98 AUt. 809 (1916).
27 Baker v. Monarch Mercantile Co., 269 Fed. 794 (C.C.A. Sth 1921) (dissolution petition
by solvent corporation cannot be alleged as act of bankruptcy; note that if the corporation had
made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, it would have been an act of bankruptcy re-
gardiess of solvency, West Co. v. Lea, 174 U.S. 59o (1899). The result of the West case is
codified in section 3 of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 844 (1938), i U.S.C.A. § 21 (Supp.
1939)); see In re Standard Cordage Co., 184 Fed. i56 (D.C. N.Y. 191o); Glenn, Liquidation
§ 247 (i935).
29 But cf. Vassar Foundry Co. v. Whiting Co., 2 F. (2d) 240, 241 (C.C.A. 6th 1924): "So
far as the statute applies to solvent corporations, it dearly is not subject to be defined as an
insolvency law ..... So far as it affects insolvent corporations, it has many of the aspects of an
insolvency law, and perhaps enough of them to condemn it. As to that, we express no opin-
ion." See also In re Weedman Stave Co., z99 Fed. 948 (D.C. Ark. 1912).
29 Platt v. Archer, Fed. Cas. No. 11213 (C.C. N.Y. 1872); see In re Watts and Sachs, i9o
U.S. 1, 27, 31-2 (19o3) (a contempt case); In re Standard Cordage Co., 184 Fed. 156 (D.C.
N.Y. igio).
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stituted.3o Although such a bankruptcy action can be sustained as a suit to
settle the affairs of a corporation under a state statute providing that a dissolved
corporation shall remain alive in order to settle and close its affairs,3r such a
statute is probably not an essential basis for bankruptcy jurisdiction invoked
by creditors.32
Where a debtor corporation is not liquidated but undergoes a reorganization,
the question of discharge becomes important. If the corporation is not in-
solvent in the bankruptcy sense, it can be said that no discharge is involved in
the reorganization. For if the corporation is insolvent only in the sense that it
cannot pay its debts as they mature, theoretically there are sufficient assets to
pay all obligations on liquidation. Since, however, the object of reorganization
is to prevent liquidation and to preserve going-concern value, distribution is
made to creditors in the form of securities in the reorganized corporation. This
readjustment of the debt and capital structure of the corporation involves only
extension of corporate obligations, rather than composition and discharge. But
if the corporation is insolvent in the bankruptcy sense, the application of the
"fixed principle"3 of absolute priority,34 which results in the elimination of some
inferior classes of creditors from the reorganized corporation, will, in some sense,
result in discharge. Consequently, the enactment of federal bankruptcy legisla-
tion on the subject of corporate reorganizations should result in the suspension
of state jurisdiction in cases where there is insolvency in the bankruptcy sense.
There are several reasons why suspension will probably not result in re-
organization cases. Reorganization may be achieved either through an equity
receivership or under statute. The conceptual picture surrounding the equity
receivership does not include discharge of the debtor corporation's obligations.
The device normally used to achieve reorganizations through the equity
receivership is a foreclosure or execution sale of the debtor corporation's
property to a new corporation which, by virtue of the sale, takes the property
3In re Double Star Brick Co., 2io Fed. 98o (D.C. Cal. 1913); In re Storck Lumber Co.,
114 Fed. 360 (D.C. Md. 1902).
31 In re Munger Vehicle Tire Co., i59 Fed. 9oi (C.C.A. 2d igos).
32 Hammond v. Lyon Realty Co., 59 F. (2d) 592 (C.C.A. 4th i932); In re 211 East Delaware
Place Bldg. Co., 76 F. (2d) 834 (C.C.A. 7th 1935); In re Park Beach Hotel Bldg. Co., 96 F.
(2d) 886 (C.C.A. 7th 1938). Such a statute, however, is essential to an action instituted by the
corporation, Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Co., 302 U.S.
120 (1937) (a dissolved corporation cannot petition for reorganization under section 77B after
the expiration of the statutory period within which it remains alive); cf. In re Int'l Sugar
Feed Co., 23 F. Supp. 197 (Minn. 1938) (a dissolved corporation, which remains alive for the
statutory period for the purpose of dosing its affairs, can petition for reorganization under
section 77B, in the absence of express statutory prohibition).
3 Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
34 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. xo6 (i939), noted in 7 Univ. Chi. L.
Rev. 549 (i94o); see Dodd, The Los Angeles Lumber Products Company Case and Its Impli-
cations, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 713 (i94o); Strict Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 49 Yale
L. J. IO99 (I94O).
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free from all claims except those arising from the reorganization plan, unless the
sale can be attacked as a fraudulent conveyance.35 There is no discharge in the
bankruptcy sense because creditors have a (worthless) right of action for the
balance, if any, of their claims against the old corporation.3
6
State statutory reorganizations, on the other hand, apparently do not require
a sale of the property to a new corporation. Indeed, one of the advantages of a
statutory system over the equity receivership is the elimination of the purely
formal step of a sale.37 But if the reorganized corporation is the same corporate
entity, it is no longer possible to employ the fiction that the corporation which
owns the property after the reorganization is not the corporation which was
indebted. Consequently, the reorganized corporation must be discharged from
all claims not provided for in the reorganization plan38 if the purpose of the re-
organization is to be effected. Since discharge is the test of whether state legis-
lation is suspended, it would seem to follow that state reorganization statutes
may be suspended by the federal act.
But several considerations indicate that state reorganization statutes may
not be suspended by the federal act. It has been shown that because of the
special interest which a state has in the corporations it has created, state dis-
solution statutes are not suspended. If a state can dissolve a corporation and
incidentally distribute its assets, a state should also have the power to allocate
interests in a reorganized corporation, unless the paramount jurisdiction of a
federal court supersedes the action in the state court. Since there is no time
limit to supersession by the federal court of a corporate reorganization in the
state court, 39 unlike the four-month limit in bankruptcy, suspension of state
jurisdiction is unnecessary.
3s Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (913); iS Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 7327
et seq. (1938); i Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences §§ 224, 225 (,940). It has
been suggested that the principle of absolute priority is protected by the due process clause,
Dodd, Reorganization through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What?, 48 Harv. L. Rev. xzoo,
1132 (1935).
36 15 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 7348 (i938).
37 Swaine, Corporate Reorganization under the Federal Bankruptcy Power, 19 Va. L. Rev.
317 (1933).
38 Provision is made in sections 226 and 228 of the Bankruptcy Act for discharge of the
debtor if the property is not conveyed to a new corporation, 52 Stat. 898-9 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A.
§§ 626, 628 (1939).
39 In re Greyling Realty Co., 74 F. (2d) 734 (C.C.A. 2d 1935); 52 Stat. 844, § 2 (21) (2938),
ix U.S.C.A. § 11 (21) (Supp. 1939); 52 Stat. 902, § 257 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 657 (1939).
Under section 77B it was held that if a mortgagee or trustee under a deed of trust was, under
state law, in possession after condition broken, as owner, he could not be ousted by the
bankruptcy court, In re Frances E. Willard Nat'l Temperance Hospital, 82 F. (2d) 804
(C.C.A. 7th 1936); see Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 297 U.S. 216, 222 (1936);
Tuttle v. Harris, 297 U.S. 225, 226 (z936). Section 257 was drafted to change this result.
A practical limitation on supersession exists because it is within the discretion of the fed-
eral court to allow a state reorganization to proceed, In re Prairie Ave. Bldg. Co., ii F, Supp.
125 (Ill. 1935).
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Furthermore, discharge under a composition statute which gives a stated pro-
portion of each class power to bind dissenters may be discharge by contract,
rather than discharge by operation of law. It was early held, to prevent the
invalidation of all state insolvency legislation by the impairment of contracts
clause of the Federal Constitution, that creditors contract with debtors on the
basis of existing insolvency legislation.4o This type of contracting, however, was
never considered sufficient to make discharge under a state insolvency statute
a discharge by contract instead of by operation of law, and therefore was not
sufficient to prevent suspension of state insolvency statutes when federal bank-
ruptcy legislation was enacted.4* But there is a further type of consent involved
in composition statutes which distinguishes them from ordinary insolvency
statutes. The reorganization plan, unlike ordinary discharge, must be con-
sented to by a stated proportion of each class sharing in the reorganized cor-
poration.42 Each creditor in effect contracts to be bound by the assent of a
certain proportion of his class, provided the assenters act with full knowledge
of the circumstances and in the interest of the class. Where the insolvency of
the corporation necessitates some inferior classes being excluded from the re-
organization plan, these classes may be considered as having contracted for a
fair valuation by the court which may result in their exclusion. If this view is
accepted, courts should discriminate between types of state statutes. Those
which approach the standards of the federal act in surrounding the reorganiza-
tion process with safeguards may not be suspended, because the consent of the
majority under such circumstances, being based on the opportunity to learn
all the facts, amounts to a discharge by contract. But acts without safeguards
looking toward complete knowledge may be suspended. At present, state cor-
porate reorganization legislation is not sufficiently varied to make the sug-
gested distinction practical.
In addition to the foregoing considerations, it appears that Congress has
shown an intention not to suspend state jurisdiction over corporate reorganiza-
tion. Section 256 of the Bankruptcy Act43 provides that a petition may be filed
under Chapter X "notwithstanding the pendency of a prior mortgage fore-
closure, equity, or other proceeding in a court of the United States or of any
State in which a receiver or trustee of all or any part of the property of a debtor
has been appointed or for whose appointment an application has been made."
Other sections of Chapter X refer to equity or alternative proceedings in other
courts. 44 It is probable, therefore, that Congress intended not only to allow
40 Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 213 (1827).
41 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929).
42 See note 3 supra.
43 52 Stat. 902 (1938), 3[ U.S.C.A. § 656 (1939).
44 52 Stat. 884, §113 (r938), i1 U.S.C.A. § 513 (1939); 52 Stat. 886, § 1r (1938), ii
U.S.C.A. § 531 (1939); 52 Stat. 887, § 146 (1938), i1 U.S.C.A. § 546 (1939); 52 Stat. 888,
§ 148 (1938), II U.S.C.A. § 548 (1939).
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state proceedings in the absence of supervening federal jurisdiction under
Chapter X, but also to preserve the federal remedy of an equity receivership.
While it is undoubtedly within the power of Congress to preserve existing
federal remedies, a serious question is raised as to the power of Congress to
preserve state jurisdiction in bankruptcy after it has passed national bank-
ruptcy legislation. The solution turns on interpreting the constitutional grant
to Congress of power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies.s
The uniformity requirement has been interpreted to mean geographical uni-
formity throughout the nation, and hence does not prevent Congressional
recognition of state exemption laws in bankruptcy proceedings.46 This inter-
pretation would seemingly not prevent Congress from affirmatively indicating
that state power over corporate reorganization shall not be suspended. Further-
more, it was indicated in International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus47 that the Supreme
Court may regard the doctrine of suspension of state jurisdiction as resting on
the implied intention of Congress, rather than on the constitutional require-
ment of uniformity. The Court declared:
The purpose to exclude state action for the discharge of insolvent debtors may be
manifested without specific declaration to that end; that which is clearly implied is of
equal force as that which is expressed ..... In respect of bankruptcies the intention
of Congress is plain. The national purpose to establish uniformity necessarily excludes
state regulation ..... Congress did not intend to give insolvent debtors seeking dis-
charge, or their creditors seeking to collect claims, choice between the relief provided
by the Bankruptcy Act and that specified in state insolvency laws.48
If the implied intention of Congress is the basis for suspending state bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction, the analogous doctrine of the negative implications of the
commerce clause should be considered. In the field of so-called "national"
interstate commerce, in which the courts say uniformity of regulation is re-
quired, the absence of federal legislation is said to indicate the intention of
Congress to leave the field free from state regulation. When Congress by
affirmative action opens the field to state regulation, the barrier is removed.49
So in bankruptcy, the clear intention of Congress not to exclude state jurisdic-
tion over corporate reorganizations should be sufficient to overcome the con-
trary intention inferred by the courts from the mere exercise of the federal
power. Should the exercise of state jurisdiction be undesirable in any case, the
power of the federal court to supersede the state court proceedings provides
sufficient protection for all parties to the reorganizationso
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, the decision in the recent case of First
4S U.S. Const. art. i, § 8.
46 Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, i86 U.S. 181 (1902).
47 278 U.S. 261 (1929). 48 Ibid., at 265.
49 See Sholley, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
556 (1936); Bikl6, The Silence of Congress, 4! Harv. L. Rev. 200 (1927).
P0 See note 39 supra.
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Robinsons' may be criticized. The circuit court of
appeals held that the state statute providing for the liquidation or reorganiza-
tion of insolvent corporations was suspended because the federal government
had occupied the field under section 77B. It, despite the reasons advanced in
this note in support of state jurisdiction in the reorganization field, state re-
ceivership statutes are held suspended under the reasoning of the Robinson
case, states may nevertheless continue to exercise jurisdiction over reorganiza-
tions through the equity receivership. That this may be true is indicated by
the attempt of counsel in the Robinson case to have the receivership treated
as an equity proceeding, and by the reply of the court that the receiver was
appointed under the state statute. This distinction, between an equity receiver-
ship and a state statutory receivership, receives further support from the state-
ment in In re SterbaS2 that the remedy of an equity receivership is not the
equivalent of a proceeding under the reorganization acts. Hence it may be
contended that federal legislation which suspends similar state statutes has no
effect on the equity receivership, apart from the power of a federal court to
supersede an equity proceeding.53 An analogy in support of this result is found
in the previous discussion of the assignment for the benefit of creditors: the
assignment has been sustained, even though statutory assignments have been
suspended, because it is a remedy which existed at common law.54 This ap-
proach, however, results in a return to the equity receivership, the evils of
which reorganization legislation was intended to obviate. Nevertheless, the
states should have the power to regulate the equity receivership for the pur-
pose of eliminating its evils, as they have been held to have the power to provide
legislative safeguards for the administration of assignments for the benefit of
creditors.ss
NEGRO RESTRICTIONS AND THE "CHANGED
CONDITIONS" DOCTRINE
During the last two decades many property owners in our larger cities have
entered into covenants prohibiting the sale or rental of real estate to Negroes.
Subdividers have included the restrictive covenant in deeds of conveyance, and
"improvement associations" in already established residential neighborhoods
have encouraged property owners in a given area to sign and record group agree-
ments limiting the use or sale of their respective parcels to members of the
5' 107 F. (2d) 5o (C.C.A. ioth 1939); see Effect of National Bankruptcy Act on State In-
solvency Statutes, 49 Yale L. J. ro9o (194o). Contra: Gallagher v. Keystone Realty Holding
Co., 333 Pa. 9, 3 A. (2d) 426 (1939) (upholding the appointment of a receiver for a corporation
under a state statute whose discharge feature had been suspended (see note rg supra). The
court followed the intention of Congress argument (see notes 43-4, 47-9 supra, and related
text)).
52 74 F. (2d) 413 (C.C.A. 7th 1935). But cf. Finletter, Bankruptcy Reorganization 3 (1939).
s3 See note 39 supra. 54 See note 24 supra. ss See note 20 supra.
